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comments.Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy. 
Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmental 
policies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instruments 
first based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thus 
the political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses poten-
tially ascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on the 
willingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantly 
smaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but the 
losses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposed 
to other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collective 
action problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization and 
localized contextual effects.  
Key policy insight: 
■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of their
high incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.
■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the political
acceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effects
for climate change.
■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and large
distributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their political
acceptability.
Keywords: Climate Policies, Employment Impacts, Inequality and Distributional Impacts, Collective Action 
Problems, Amplification Mechanisms, Political Acceptability.
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1.
See Greenstone (2002), Walker 
(2011) and Smith (2015). 
2.
See, e.g., Allcott and Mullainathan 
(2010) and Sovacool et al. (2015).Job-killing regulation is a constant argument put forward by carbon intensive 
industries to undermine the political acceptability of unilateral climate policies. The 
exit of the US from the Paris Agreement is just the most recent symptom of a political 
choice justified by the need to defend the jobs of coal miners and blue-collar workers in 
energy-intensive sectors. Existing research shows that the aggregate benefits of envi-
ronmental policies in terms of improved health largely exceed the costs of job losses for 
these exposed categories.1 In the US, Vona et al. (2017) even underscore the substan-
tial job creation effects of the green part of the Obama stimulus package. Focusing only 
on labor market costs and the benefits of climate policies, this work suggests that the 
jobs destroyed in energy-intensive industries are likely to be offset by new well-paid 
jobs in green industries, such as renewable energy, building retrofitting, waste 
management and pollution abatement. The relocation from brown to green jobs can, 
however, be difficult, particularly given the potentially large (or perceived large) differ-
ences in their skill profiles (Vona et al., 2018). For instance, Walker (2013) shows that 
the permanent earnings losses for workers displaced by the Clean Air Act can be large, 
especially for those who change industries. Taken together, this evidence seems to 
suggest that new jobs in green sectors are unlikely to be taken by workers displaced by 
environmental policies, who instead will experience permanent earnings losses in 
subsequent jobs. 
Overall, extreme distributional effects, either in terms of long-term unemployed or 
permanent earnings losses, may undermine the political acceptability and thus the 
support for environmental policies. This essay discusses this issue using the prism of the 
collective action theory (Olson, 1965) and by building a parallel with recent empirical 
research on trade liberalization (Autor et al., 2013, 2016). Undoubtedly, the political 
acceptability of climate policies is a broad issue that cannot be merely reduced to the 
iconic lobbying efforts of green activists on the one hand and miners and oil companies 
on the other. However, I argue that in a world with growing inequality and declining 
political participation, behavioral and contextual factors reinforce the consequences of 
severe job losses on the political acceptability of climate policies. 
Sociological, behavioral and economic drivers of green 
preferences
To frame my argument in a general way, it is useful to briefly examine the drivers of 
green preferences. Individuals play multiple roles associated with multiple types of 
impacts on the environment. They are basically consumers and workers as well as, 
under certain conditions, voters and green or brown political activists. Their environ-
mentally related choices in each of these roles are driven by both economic and non-
economic factors provided that individuals are bounded rational actors embedded in a 
social context and endowed with inherited beliefs. 
For convenience, I summarize these drivers in Table 1 where I list the main sociolog-
ical and economic drivers of green behavior. In the two columns, I distinguish between 
the drivers of green preferences and those of green political participation, which is 
useful to discuss how the size of the distributional effects of climate policies affect differ-
ently green preferences and political participation. 
Among the main sociological and behavioral drivers, which are discussed exten-
sively elsewhere,2 intrinsic values (e.g., ethical considerations, intergenerational 
equity), inaccurate perceptions of health impacts and behavioral inertia explain, for
OFCE  policy brief |  3
rticipation
lly geographically 
factors likely to be more 
3.
The relationship between economic 
growth and the unemployment rate 
is called the Okun’s law.
4.
See, e.g., Allcott (2011), Biel and 
Thøgersen (2007) and Babutsidze 
and Chai (2018).instance, the energy efficiency puzzle. Contextual factors, such as social norms and 
peer effects, are also very important for the political acceptability of climate policies in 
making individuals aware of environmental problems and of their economically viable 
solutions. Recent research has shown that imitation effects increased the political 
acceptability of both feed-in tariffs and solar rooftop PV panels in Germany and Cali-
fornia.3 Social comparisons are also shown to affect the adoption of energy-efficient 
behaviors or mitigation practices.4 
With regard to economic drivers, the impacts can be conveniently divided 
depending on their size and concentration. As consumers, individuals are affected by 
climate policies that alter the relative prices of goods with different carbon intensity. 
Empirical evidence on the environmental Kuznets curve shows that green preferences 
emerge once basic needs are satisfied (Dinda, 2004). Unless the health effects of 
climate change are easily understandable, verifiable and thus perceived to be large, 
poorer households are unlikely to be willing to approve policies that, at least in the 
medium term, increase the cost of electricity or of gas. However, it is also very unlikely 
that small distributional impacts, such as those associated with changes in the relative 
prices of brown and green goods, will emerge into a clear opposition to climate poli-
cies. Indeed, environmental policies represent just a small component of a broader 
political package and are likely dominated by other policies, such as fiscal policy. To 
illustrate, a party that proposes a carbon tax and an increase in tax progressivity is likely 
to be voted for by less-advantaged households on the basis of small distributional 
effects of the climate policy.
The issue is likely to be different for extreme events or large distributional effects, 
notably job losses ascribed to climate policies or climate-related disasters. While it is 
difficult to verify whether the shutdown of a coal power plant is due to a carbon tax, to 
technological obsolescence or to savings on labor costs, the workers’ perception in 
energy-intensive industries is to ascribe it to environmental regulations. Clearly, such a 
perception is induced by industrial lobbies that support the job-killing argument to 
advocate reductions in the stringency of climate policies. Although existing research 
shows that the risk of job losses is not enough to justify the grandfathering of emissions 
permits and generous policy exceptions for trade-exposed, energy-intensive sectors 
(Ekins and Speck 1999; Martin et al. 2014), there is substantial empirical evidence indi-
cating that carbon pricing can induce a relocation of economic activities and thus of 
employment toward regions (within a country) and countries (globally) with laxer envi-
ronmental policies (Mulatu et al., 2010; Kahn and Mansur, 2013). Moreover, since 
energy-intensive industries tend to be geographically concentrated, job losses are 
magnified by negative local multiplier effects. 
Table 1. Drivers of Green Preferences and Participation
Green preferences Green political pa
Economic
Any income effects of climate policy, e.g.,  
distributional effects of carbon taxation
Large income effects, essentia
concentrated job losses
Non-economic
Contextual factors & social norms, behavioral 
inertia, intrinsic values, intergenerational and 
ethical considerations, perceived health effects
Same drivers, but contextual 
important
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In order to aggregate the large distributional effects of climate policies, the key 
statistic is the share of workers employed in energy-intensive sectors. In developed 
countries, this share ranged between 2.9% and 5.5% in 2009 (Table 2). Out of this 
share, job losses with negligible hope of successful relocation to an equivalent position 
in terms of pay scale and social status are limited to those workers that are also exposed 
to other negative shocks, notably low-skilled blue-collar jobs (Acemoglu and Autor, 
2011). After losing their jobs in a polluting industry, such workers are very unlikely to 
find an equivalent manufacturing job in terms of pay, career development and occupa-
tional prestige. The most likely outcome will be re-employed in a low-skilled service job 
at the bottom end of the wage distribution. As a result, the distributional effects of 
climate policy can be summarized as follows: we have a large majority of modest 
winners and a tiny fraction of big and already vulnerable losers, in a range between less 
than 1% and 3.5% of the workforce for most developed countries (Table 3). That is, we 
are in the presence of a classic collective action problem because agents that are 
modestly winning are unlikely to get organized to support climate policy, while the 
losers have everything at stake if the policy is approved. Notice that carbon leakage, 
i.e., the relocation of polluting activities to countries with lax environmental policies, 
cancels the health benefits of a unilateral climate policy and thus makes the winners 
even less likely to organize an active support to environmental policies. 
Cragg et al. (2013) show that US congressional representatives from carbon-inten-
sive and poorer areas have a lower probability of voting in favor of anti-carbon 
legislation. Taking stock of these findings, it seems that the perceived negative effect of 
regulation on jobs shapes the electors’ preferences, especially in most vulnerable 
regions where job opportunities in other sectors are absent or unattractive. There is a 
strong analogy here to what occurred with trade policies in the US. Autor et al. (2016) 
show that US regions more exposed to Chinese competition are also those that after its 
entry into the WTO (in 2001) embraced extreme right-wing positions, e.g., the Tea 
Party. This result bears relevance for climate policies because manufacturing jobs disap-
peared not only in textile industries but also in the dirtier segments of equipment 
manufacturing, metals and chemicals. Going a step further, the tight election of 
Donald Trump in former industrial states of the Rust Belt can be explained as a miscal-
culation of the dramatic effect of trade liberalization for certain demographic groups, 
especially middle-aged white men. Although labor cost differentials are the main 
drivers of industry relocation and consequently of this political turnaround, the Clean 
Air Act contributed to creating losers in trade-exposed, energy-intensive industries.
A plausible counter-argument is that climate policies also create winners, namely, 
firms and workers in emerging green sectors that can organize and combat the brown 
political constituency. No doubt, the winners have created green constituencies in 
support of climate policies everywhere. However, there is a fundamental asymmetry 
between brown losers, who are low-skilled individuals with few outside opportunities, 
and green winners, who instead seem to be high-skilled workers with plenty of outside 
opportunities (Vona et al., 2018). The extent to which this asymmetry translates into a 
different degree of effective political participation and activism remains an open issue.
Either way, concerns about the political consequences of trade and climate policies 
in a world with substantial differences in labor and environmental costs have received 
too little attention in the political debate. The electoral arithmetic of the median voter is 
clearly right, especially for climate policies that have first-order effects on a very small 
fraction of the population, but the political result may be different from what median 
voter theory would say due to the presence of amplifying factors.  
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ducation.Amplifying the Collective Action Problem 
Two well-known trends are amplifying the collective action problem. First, down-
ward trends in political participation in developed countries are the first factor that can 
exacerbate collective action problems. The second is related to changing contextual 
factors and, more specifically, to the well-known concomitant rise of inequality within a 
country, especially developed countries that should lead international negotiations to 
drastically reduce GHG emissions. 
Let me discuss first the role played by declining political participation. My conjec-
ture is that the decline in political participation has increased the political influence of 
those who lose from climate policies. Arithmetically, the losers are simply counting 
more on electoral outcomes than the winners if, as predicted by the logic of collective 
action, the share of voters is higher for the former group. Even more important, the 
losers will become politically active on climate-related issues, thus contributing to the 
dissemination of the job-killing argument in the public debate. The concomitant 
decline in unionization rates is a related amplifying factor insofar as intermediate polit-
Table 2. Workers in Highly Polluting Industries, as a share of the total employment
 Germany Denmark France UK Italy Japan
1997 0,065 0,049 0,049 0,047 0,066 0,061
2000 0,061 0,047 0,045 0,042 0,065 0,057
2003 0,057 0,043 0,042 0,037 0,064 0,053
2006 0,055 0,041 0,040 0,032 0,063 0,052
2009 0,048 0,036 0,034 0,029 0,054 0,043
Note: source EU-KLEMS data. Selected high-income countries. Highly Polluting industries according to ISIC rev.4 codes are: C “
cated Metals”; 24 “Chemicals”;  26 “Other Non-Metallic Minerals”; 23 “Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear”; 20 “Wood and
eration is excluded as it is non-tradable. The share is computed as the sum of the hours worked in highly polluting industries o
economy. 
Table 3. Vulnerable Workers in Highly Polluting Industries, as a share of the total employment
Low Skilled Share
 Germany Denmark France UK Italy Japan
1997 0,013 0,014 0,018 0,016 0,040 0,013
2000 0,012 0,012 0,016 0,012 0,036 0,010
2003 0,010 0,010 0,013 0,010 0,035 0,007
2006 0,010 0,010 0,011 0,007 0,031 0,007
2009 0,007 0,010 0,009 0,007 0,025 0,006
Low and Medium Skilled Share
 Germany Denmark France UK Italy Japan
1997 0,054 0,038 0,041 0,037 0,062 0,050
2000 0,050 0,036 0,037 0,032 0,061 0,046
2003 0,045 0,032 0,035 0,027 0,060 0,042
2006 0,044 0,030 0,030 0,023 0,058 0,041
2009 0,037 0,026 0,026 0,021 0,049 0,034
Note: source EU-KLEMS data. Highly Polluting industries are: C “Mining”; 27t28 “Basic and Fabricated Metals”; 24 “Chemicals”
als”; 23 “Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear”; 20 “Wood and Products of Wood”. Power generation is excluded as it is non-
computed as the hours worked by workers with no more than lower seconday education in highly polluting industries over tot
The 'low and medium skilled share' is computed in a similar manner. Medium skilled workers are those with upper secondary e
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offered by the development of green sectors. While the International Labor Organiza-
tion plays a key role in promoting sustainable growth, it is unlikely that national unions 
will actively negotiate greener investment strategies with multinational and local firms. 
Indeed, the bargaining power of unions has decreased in response to deindustrializa-
tion and to the threat of further relocations; thus, jobs have the priority over 
environmental quality in negotiations with industrial associations. This dynamic 
explains the persistence of heavily polluting sites in rich European countries, such as the 
ILVA in Taranto (Italy) and the Alteo in Ciotat (France). 
The second amplifying factor is related to both the economic and non-economic 
drivers mentioned in Table 1. Societies with high levels of income inequality are less 
willing to invest in reducing their carbon footprint. The median voters in such countries 
are poorer and thus not ready to exchange the short-term adjustment costs with the 
long-term economic and environmental benefits of green growth (e.g., Magnani, 
2000). Job-killing political discourses will easily influence the green political beliefs of 
those living in areas heavily affected by deindustrialization. Furthermore, because 
inequality between rich and poor communities has increased substantially (OECD, 
2016; Rosés and Wolf, 2018), the likelihood of interacting with a worker who has been 
negatively affected by globalization, either for labor or environmental reasons, is higher 
in disadvantaged communities. Because social interactions nourish political beliefs as 
well as consumers’ preferences, segregated societies will exacerbate collective action 
problems through peer effects. Put differently, a few losers from climate policies can 
fuel a substantial opposition to these policies because the negative effects of deindustri-
alization are heavily concentrated in certain communities. To reinforce the hostility 
against climate policies in poor communities, Rosés and Wolf (2018) show that regions 
with a very high shares of energy-intensive industries and mining have been the main 
losers of the European deindustrialization in last four decades. Group identity also acts 
as an amplifier insofar as brown jobs not only are geographically concentrated but also 
are dominated by white prime-age males—a group heavily exposed to trade shocks 
(Autor et al., 2017). 
The extreme forms of discontent created by climate policies are a gift to the true 
vested interests defending the status quo of lax carbon regulations: the companies in 
heavily polluting sectors. The job-killing argument is just a weapon in the basket of 
brown lobbies, although it is certainly an important one. A pragmatic approach to 
climate policy should hence consider setting countervailing mechanisms to minimize 
the collective action problem associated with extreme economic events. 
Conclusions 
Several complementary policies can mitigate the losses for workers in highly 
exposed industries. Ideally, we need industrial policies that support the green economy 
combined with retraining policies as well as a clear identification of the differences in 
the skill profiles of brown and green jobs. However, this approach may not suffice if 
specialization in greener production is persistent and thus difficult to transfer to areas 
lagging behind. The evidence in Vona et al. (2017) suggests that this is the case, as the 
areas creating more green jobs are also high-tech and host of a national research lab. 
Such persistence is not surprising given the high degree of innovativeness of green 
products compared to polluting products.
 A less ambitious plan that seems to have worked well in Canada is to recycle the 
revenues from a carbon tax to reduce labor taxation (Yamazaki, 2017). While this tax 
OFCE  policy brief |  7reform may not prevent the relocation of polluting industries or parts of such industries 
elsewhere, it will increase the incentives to create jobs in other sectors. The key issue is 
then to compare the working conditions in new jobs with those in brown jobs. The risk 
is that new job opportunities will be concentrated in low-skilled segments of the 
service sector and thus that the political discontent caused by climate policies will not 
be mitigated. 
Finally, carbon border adjustments may be a suitable option to prevent carbon 
leakage and the associated job losses (Helm et al., 2012). Carbon border adjustments 
appear to be the ideal policy to invalidate the rhetoric of the job-killing argument and 
ensure the widespread acceptability of climate policies. In addition, the health benefits 
associated with emissions reductions will be more evident because countries with laxer 
environmental regulations will be induced to reduce their emissions-to-output ratios to 
export to rich countries. The problem here is that carbon border adjustments face 
fierce opposition from emerging countries, especially China. Increasing the awareness 
of the health benefits from reduced emissions may be a way to overcome the resist-
ance of these countries. Another possibility is to propose a countervailing acceleration 
of trade liberalization in environmental goods to induce China and other emerging 
countries, which are or can easily become net exporters of these goods, to accept 
border carbon adjustments. 
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